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We provide experimental evidence about ethnic discrimination in the labor market in 
Georgia. We randomly assign Georgian and non-Georgian, male and female, names to 
similar resumes and apply for jobs as advertised in help-wanted web sites in Georgia. 
We find that gender has no effect on the probability of callback, but a job applicant who 
is ethnic Georgian is twice more likely to be called for a job interview than an equally 
skilled ethnic non-Georgian (Azeri or Armenian). The almost 100% gap in callbacks is 
statistically significant and cannot be abridged by having more experience or education. 
Both taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination models are consistent with 
the evidence provided in this study. Labor market discrimination tends to aggravate in 
economic busts.  
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I. Introduction 
Beyond the social and societal damage it inflicts, labor market discrimination, inasmuch as it implies a 
misallocation of resources, inhibits the productivity, income, and growth of the country. These effects are more 
remarkable when the country in question is a small transition, developing country like Georgia. Despite them 
comprising a large share of the population, little is being done to integrate the ethnic minorities living in 
Georgia into civic life; and discrimination in the labor market contributes to the persistence of this exclusion 
from the social, economic, and political life.  
We study the incidence of discrimination in the Georgian labor market of higher-level jobs, using a 
similar experimental design that was devised by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). In particular, we create a 
bank of fictitious resumes, to which we randomly assign names of Georgian and non-Georgian (Azeri and 
Armenian), male and female, job applicants.1 Using these resumes, we then apply for jobs that are posted on 
the most popular employment services web sites in Georgia, and record the outcome of each application, 
whether the applicant received a callback for an interview or not. 550 jobs received a full set of 4-resumes 
each, resulting in our sample of 2200 job applications.2 We then analyze the employers’ response data to 
uncover any patterns in the data, and learn about any preferential treatment of different ethnicities or genders 
in the hiring context which, if exists, is taken as an evidence of labor market discrimination against the group 
in question. 
The seminal work of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), carrying out a field experiment to study the 
effect of discrimination in the U.S. labor market, initiated a wave of similar studies in different countries, for 
example: Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez (2014) for Mexico; Kaas and Manger (2012) for Germany; 
Banerjee et al (2009) for India; Carlsson and Rooth (2007) for Sweden, to name just a few of the recent 
examples. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of this type conducted in a Former Soviet 
                                                          
1 There are other small ethnic minorities in Georgia, but we limit our attention to the largest and distinct ethnic minorities 
in the country, namely, Armenian and Azeri, who constituted about 12.2% of the population, according to the population 
census of 2002. This went down to around 11% in 2014, but remained the largest combined minority group; Russians 
constituted the next largest minority in Georgia, amounting to only 0.7% of the population.  
2 Originally we had 2208 applications, but we excluded from the analysis all the firms that did not receive a full set of 
applications (one for each gender-ethnicity combination). 
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Union/Central and Eastern European Country and the second in a transition context after Maurer-Fazio (2012) 
for China.  
The current study contributes to this literature in different ways. First, we study simultaneous ethnic and 
gender discrimination in the Georgian labor market, that was not explored before. Georgia is an interesting case 
to study, because of its exceptional labor market environment. A Former Soviet Union Country, Georgia 
adopted in 2006 a new liberal Labor Code that eliminated Soviet-era burdens on the freedom to contract and 
made the cost of employing workers very low. Mandatory minimum wage requirements were kept so low to 
be clearly not binding3 and no obligatory overtime costs were implied4. At the same time, while the Labor Code 
explicitly forbids “discrimination of any kind […] during the labor relations”5, multiple sources confirm the 
lack of enforcement of such provision6. Thus, it is interesting to compare the results obtained in this study with 
the results from relatively more regulated labor markets, such as the US, Sweden, Germany, and other European 
countries, as well as from developing countries like India, Mexico, and China. 
Second, since the study spans over the whole year, we can relate to the relationship between 
unemployment and discrimination. Third, along with our experimental data, we use existing household survey 
data to both explore the representativeness of the experimental sample, and thus the external validity of the 
results based on its analysis, and to point out directions in which existing observational survey data can be used 
for causal inference.   
We find extremely large ethnic differences in callback rates, larger than any such gap observed in the 
previous studies, in all the countries. In particular, ethnic Georgian job applicants, whether males or females, 
receive about 100% more callbacks than their non-ethnic-Georgian (henceforth non-Georgians) counterparts. 
                                                          
3 The mandatory minimum wage does exist but it is as if it didn’t – 20 GEL (less than 8 USD) per month for private 
employees and 115 GEL (43 USD) for public employees (the subsistence level in 2016 for an “average consumer” was 
142 GEL). 
4 Even if the 2006 Labor Code did mention the existence of overtime, it also stated that the “Terms of the overtime labor 
are defined upon consent of the parties”. The current provision is not very different: “Overtime work shall be compensated 
by the hour based on increased pay rate. The amount of the above compensation shall be determined by agreement between 
the parties”. (Labor Code of Georgia, 2013 -  article 17). 
5 Article 2 comma 3. Labor code of Georgia, 2013. 
6 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252849 (last accessed 1.2.2017) 
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To receive one callback, a non-Georgian applicant needs to send 16 job applications, whereas a Georgian 
applicant needs to send only about 7 applications.  
This stark difference is highly statistically significant, and cannot be abridged by improvement in human 
capital variables like experience or education; because, once accounted for ethnicity, no other variable or 
credential has any statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a callback. Ethnicity is the single most 
important variable in hiring decisions—rendering both statistical discrimination models and taste-based 
employer discrimination models equally suitable for explaining the causes of the callback gap.  
Within the non-Georgian ethnic group, that is between Armenian and Azeri applicants, there is no 
evidence of discrimination in hiring. Discrimination in hiring in the Georgian labor market does not seem to be 
motivated by gender, either. In fact, within each ethnicity, female applicants apparently receive more callbacks 
per application than male applicants—but this difference is not statistically significant. Also, we note that 
during economic busts employers are reluctant to hire new staff, but more so for non-Georgian job applicants, 
resulting in higher discrimination rates during high-unemployment periods. When unemployment increases by 
1% the gap in the probability of a callback between Georgians and non-Georgians increases by 0.02. 
Notwithstanding the clear and significant findings, it is important to note that our experimental data suffer 
from the same weaknesses acknowledged in this literature, first by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), like the 
use of ethnic-sounding names rather than actual ethnicity input, using a callback in lieu of a real job offer or 
wage per offer, and using a specific channel for job ads can be limiting.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the data collection procedure and steps, 
as well as the experimental and research design. In section III we report the main results of the study, and relate 
to different related issues like using observational survey data to study similar questions, and studying the 
relationship between the macro economy and ethnic discrimination. Section IV concludes. II. Research Design 
and Data 
We use experimental design to study the hiring decisions of employers inasmuch as that is affected by the 
ethnic background of job seekers. Experimental design, in particular correspondence testing, cannot be utilized 
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in all the sectors of the Georgian labor market, because workers’ recruitment procedures are different across 
sectors, and not all are susceptible of a formal application by correspondence. In most blue-collar positions, for 
example, workers are recruited through the social network, by asking friends and relatives, rather than by 
sending resumes; or, otherwise, interested candidates are advised to visit the potential employer in-person. It 
is, therefore, important to identify the sectors to which job applications and resumes are to be sent. 
To facilitate the implementation of the correspondence testing, therefore, and since the opportunity cost of 
discrimination in hiring is larger in higher-level jobs, we direct our attention to this type of jobs. In low-skill 
jobs, on the other hand, prejudice (and asymmetric information) play no major role. Furthermore, 
unemployment does not seem to differ in this type of jobs by gender or ethnicity, so it is less of a concern in 
low-skill jobs. For all these reasons, focusing on the higher-level jobs is both interesting and important. 
It is of no consequence, however, to the particular choice of a specific sector. After all, we cover a wide array 
of industry types which includes, among others: administrative, financial, technical, and sales jobs. Moreover, 
the Georgian context is suitable for this kind of experimental design as far as a sophisticated short-listing 
software has not been implemented, which would not allow for controlling the ethnicity and gender of the 
candidate.    
For the sake of concreteness and simplicity we limit ourselves to two groups of ethnic minorities, Azeri and 
Armenians, which are the biggest ethnic minority groups in Georgia (6.5% and 5.7%, respectively)7 and have 
easily recognizable last names, which sound completely different from Georgian. Rather than sending two 
different quality resumes,8 we send only normal quality, four similar in qualifications resumes, assigning them 
ethnic Georgian and ethnic minority sounding names and gender. For the same reason, we also reply to the 
openings only in the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, to avoid the geographic heterogeneity of discrimination. It is 
not a major limitation as far as the vast majority of the vacancies announced is based in the capital city.  
Internet-based job-posting agencies are the main source of employment ads we use in our study. The most 
                                                          
7 The population census of 2002, National Statistics Office of Georgia. 
8 As in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). 
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popular web sites where higher level job openings are announced are: www.jobs.ge and www.hr.com.ge.  
We build a bank of fictitious resumes, using the resumes of real applicants, after changing the names and 
modifying different components to match some of the job requirements as listed in the employment ads. The 
slight changes we introduce, moreover, serve to rule out identification of real applicants.   
A. Detailed Data Collection Procedure  
After the job opening being announced we prepare the relevant set of four resumes, initially creating the new 
ones, but subsequently drawing from the resumes previously created for similar announcement and slightly 
altering it. Then we randomly assign ethnic Georgian and ethnic minority sounding last names and female and 
male specific names to resumes. The names are drawn from the pool of the names and surnames created in 
advance from the actual election voters list for 2008. We also include real email address and mobile number, 
different for two ethnic groups and gender and send to the designated email address. In case we receive the call 
backs on either phone number, we make sure to identify the vacancy we are called back for, the company and 
politely refuse the offer.       
When applying for the announced job opening we create a detailed database of the vacancies we are applying 
for such as: type of the company, industry, ownership of the company (foreign or domestic), position and 
detailed requirements of the opening on the one hand and on the other hand we also create the database of the 
applicants and their characteristics and qualifications including age, gender, type and years of education, 
experience, computer skills.   
B. Data Collection (March 2009 to February 2010)  
We start replying to vacancies in March 2009. We continue this process, on a monthly basis, until February 
2010. Overall, we reply to 552 job announcements.9 In Table 1 we report the number of vacancies listed in the 
aforementioned sites, as well as the number of resumes we sent and the number of callbacks we received, for 
                                                          
9 However, we limit our analysis to 550 job advertisements, that each of which received a full set of applications (four 
applications: male and female Georgian, and male and female non-Georgian). Including the other two employment ads 
in the analysis has virtually no effect on the results.  
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each month of the study period. 
[TABLE 1] 
The vast majority of the companies are private (87.5%), domestic (58.7%) firms. We divide the 
companies in five industries: Financial, which includes banks, insurance companies, accounting and other 
financial institutions; Marketing includes sales, distribution, market research and analysis, etc.; Service sector 
includes all other services, such as hotels, cleaning, hospitals, educational entities, etc.; Production, which is 
small part of the all companies, includes wine producing firms, pharmaceutical companies, bakeries, etc. The 
last smallest group includes some miscellaneous companies that do not fall under any categories described 
above.  
Positions announced are also divided into five occupations: Financial, that includes accountants, finance 
managers, finance assistants, loan experts, etc.; Administrative, such as office managers, assistants, general 
managers, etc.; Information Technology occupations; Marketing, which includes sales managers, sales 
workers, researchers, distributors, etc.; Other includes miscellaneous occupations.  
C. Econometric set-up  
Researchers generally use a simple probit model for estimating the effect of different variables on the 
probability of callbacks (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004, and similar studies that followed). We, 
however, use a complementary log-log model to study the effect of ethnicity, as well as applicant and job 
characteristics, on the probability of receiving a callback. The complimentary log-log analysis is different from 
traditional probit and logit models in the sense that transformation is not symmetric (it approaches zero slowly, 
and one fast), thus it is more appropriate in cases where the positive outcome is relatively rare, as is the case in 
our study. The model we estimate is:  
Pr(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑟 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑟) = 1 − exp[− exp(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑟𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑟) ],  
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑟 is the vector of control variables as well as ethnicity, this being Georgian and Armenian (the omitted 
group is Azeri), of individual 𝑖 who is applying to job 𝑗 with job requirements 𝑟. The list of individual controls 
includes: age, experience, squared experience, education, foreign experience, gender, a dummy for being ethnic 
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Georgian, and a dummy for being ethnic Armenian.  
The controls for job characteristics include: one-digit industry affiliation, one-digit occupational affiliation, 
whether the firm is private (as opposed to the public sector), whether it is domestic (as opposed to multinational 
corporations), and whether it is an NGO. The vector of control variables for job requirements include: whether 
a foreign language is required, the number of years of experience required, the minimal educational level 
required, the requirement of technical skills, and the requirements of other skills. The list of job characteristics 
and requirements is taken from the vacancy announcement.  
 
III. Empirical Findings 
A. Main Results 
We calculate the percent of callbacks among the different ethnic groups: ethnic Georgians (GE), Armenians 
(AM), and Azeri (AZ). Defining the combined groups of Armenians and Azeri applicants as “non-Georgians” 
(NGE), we also calculate the difference in callback rates between Georgians and non-Georgians, as well as 
within the non-Georgian group (i.e., between Armenians and Azeri). We carry out this analysis for the whole 
sample of applicants as well as for subgroups defined by age (as old workers, aged 27 or older), by experience 
(experienced being with 4 or more years of experience), by education (high education defined as holding two 
master’s level degrees or a PhD degree), and by gender. Table 2 reports the results from this analysis. 
[TABLE 2] 
As is clear from the table, the rate of callbacks for Georgians is more than twice that of either the Armenian or 
the Azeri (or the whole non-Georgian group combined). In the whole sample, Georgians receive 7.1% more 
callbacks than non-Georgians, and this difference is statistically significant at all conventional levels. The rate 
of callbacks is similar between the Armenians and the Azeri in the overall sample: 6.2-6.3%: the difference 
between these is 0.15% and is not statistically different from zero.  
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The same picture arises from inspecting the subgroups by age, experience, education, or gender, as shown in 
the rows 2-6 of the table. For example, older Georgian applicants receive 11.4% callbacks, which is 7.5% 
higher than the callback rate among older non-Georgian applicants.  The difference between callback rates of 
older Armenian applicants (4.8%) and older Azeri applicants (3.6%) is 1.2% which is statistically not different 
from zero. Other examples include the highly-educated applicants (with a statistically significant 7.2% 
difference in callback rates between Georgians and non-Georgians, yet an insignificant difference between 
callbacks for Armenian and Azeri applicants).  
The unconditional estimates in the table provide a first evidence about the discrimination in hiring in Georgia, 
inflicted by Georgian employers against non-Georgian ethnic groups. The results also imply that this type of 
blatant discrimination is not limited to a particular demographic group, but is experienced equally among the 
young and old, the experienced and inexperienced, the more and less educated, and males and females.  
Inspecting the distribution of callbacks by job advertisements, rather than by individual applicants, it is possible 
to distinguish between cases of equal treatment, preferential Georgian treatment, and preferential non-Georgian 
treatment. Because we can observe the reaction at the employer level, we can count the total number of 
callbacks to Georgians (G) and that to non-Georgians (N) at the job ad level. Since each employer received 
four applications (from a supposedly male-Georgian, female-Georgian, male non-Georgian, and female non-
Georgian), the possible combinations of callbacks are: zero callbacks to Georgians and zero callbacks to non-
Georgians (“0G+0N”), 1G+1N, 2G+2N—cases referred to as “equal treatment” because Georgians and non-
Georgians receive the same number of callbacks; 1G+0N, 2G+0N, 2G+1N—where Georgians are favored, and 
1N+0G, 2N+0G, and 2N+1G—where non-Georgians are favored.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of callbacks by job ad. It shows the percentage and number of jobs in each 
category, listing them under equal treatment, Georgians favored, and non-Georgians favored. Following the 
Urban Institute terminology (Fix, Michael and Struyk, 1993),10 net ethnic discrimination is defined as the ratio 
                                                          
10 As cited in http://www.urban.org/research/data-methods/data-analysis/quantitative-data-analysis/impact-
analysis/paired-testing (accessed 1.12.2016) 
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between net Georgian-favored cases to all cases, where net Georgian-favored cases is the difference between 
Georgian-favored (GF) cases and non-Georgian-favored (NGF) cases: 𝐺𝐹 − 𝑁𝐺𝐹; and where “all cases” 
includes all job ads applied to, even those with no callback at all (0G+0N), here 550 job ads of which 422 cases 
without any callback. The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines net ethnic discrimination similarly 
except for the base denominator which excludes the no-callback cases (0G+0N) (Bovenkerk F., 1992, cited in  
Cediey, E. and Foroni, F. 2008). 
The ILO definition of net discrimination excludes the no-callback cases on the grounds that the employers in 
these cases might have never received the applications in the first place, rather than practicing equal treatment 
(by equally not replying to all applicants). This definition, therefore, brings about a higher bound estimate of 
net discrimination. These measures, as well as a test for the null hypothesis that the proportion of Georgians 
favored equals that of non-Georgians favored, are all reported in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3] 
If the no-callback cases are included, we see that 83.5% of all employers practiced equal treatment (76.7% with 
no callback to either group, 5.1% with one callback for a Georgian and one callback for a non-Georgian, and 
1.6% with two callbacks for Georgians and two callbacks for non-Georgians). As Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004) and following similar studies found, most of the equal-treatment cases (91.9%) stem from the no-
callbacks records. 
Of all the employers in the sample, 14.6% favored Georgians (calling them back for an interview more than 
their non-Georgian counterparts), and 2% favored non-Georgians. Therefore, the net discrimination is 
estimated at 12.6% (14.6%-2%). Following the ILO definition of net discrimination, excluding the 0G+0N 
cases, the measure of net discrimination is: 
𝐼𝐿𝑂 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐. =
𝐺𝐹 − 𝑁𝐺𝐹
𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
=
80 − 11
550 − 422
= 53.9% 
The evidence brought here, at the employment ad level, supports the findings at the individual applicant level: 
Georgians receive more opportunities for employment than their non-Georgian fellows, and the difference is 
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starker when measured within, rather than across, employers.  
Resume Characteristics, Job Characteristics, and Job Requirements 
The evidence brought so far established the existence of a large gap in callbacks between Georgians and non-
Georgians, albeit within the non-Georgian group there was no evidence of such gap. The large ethnic gap is a 
clear sign of discrimination at the hiring stage, and can be taken as the reason or the sign for the actual labor 
market discrimination, observed both in employment and earnings. 
The mentioned gap refers to the unconditional gross gap in callbacks. To show whether the callback rates 
respond to applicant characteristics (age, experience, and education), and whether it changes with job type and 
characteristics (industry, occupation, private, domestic, etc…) or with the job requirements as listed in the 
employment ads, we now study the conditional callback rates. Table 4 lists the averages of resume 
characteristics by gender and ethnic background.  
[TABLE 4] 
The table shows that the applicant characteristics are comparable and similarly distributed across the four types 
of applications (Georgian male applicants, Georgian females, non-Georgian males, and non-Georgian females). 
For example, the average age in the overall sample is 26.6, and it is 26.8, 26.1, 26.9, and 26.5 in the four groups, 
respectively. Likewise, the average experience lies between 4.2-4.8. Foreign experience or education, and 
educational levels are identically distributed.  
Table 5 shows the main estimation results of this study. In particular, it shows the marginal effects of the 
different control variables (applicant characteristics, job characteristics, and job requirements) as well as of 
ethnicity (Georgian and Armenian, versus the Azeri as the omitted group) on the probability of receiving a 
callback. The marginal effects were calculated from an underlying complementary log-log model, with robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the job ad level. 
[TABLE 5] 
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Column (1) of Table 5, reports the marginal effects of ethnicity on the probability of callbacks, controlling for 
gender. Georgians, as shown in the table, are 7% more likely to receive a callback than Azeri or Armenian 
applicants. This substantial gap is economically and statistically significant. Females, within each ethnic group, 
are equally likely to receive a callback as male applicants. 
The second column controls for applicant characteristics, like age, experience, and education. None of these 
characteristics has any effect on the probability of callback: the only difference in callbacks stems from being 
Georgian as opposed to being non-Georgian (whether Azeri or Armenian). The conditional callback differential 
is 6% and is highly statistically significant at all conventional levels. It is apparent also here that being female 
does not have any effect on the probability of receiving a callback. 
The third and fourth columns of the table add controls for job characteristics and job requirements, respectively, 
as shown in the table. The conditional difference in callbacks between Georgians and non-Georgians is hardly 
changed by adding the control variables, and is estimated at the level of 6.2-6.3%.11 
A 6.2% ethnic differential in callback means that a job applicant with a non-Georgian name would need to send 
98.4% more applications to get the same number of callbacks as a Georgian-name applicant. Whereas a 
Georgian applicant needs to send about 8 applications to get one callback, a non-Georgian needs to send 16 
applications. This 98.4% gap in callback is statistically significant and, in terms of magnitude, is economically 
significant, and larger than any such gap found in the previous studies that we are aware of (for a wide range 
of countries and races and ethnicities).  
The gap is more remarkable in light of the fact that human capital characteristics of the applicants are found to 
have no effect on the probability of callback. That is, there is no enough years of experience or enough years 
of education that can compensate for the ethnic differential in callbacks. Try as they may, non-Georgian 
applicants will not be able to match the callback rate of their Georgian counterparts. 
                                                          
11 There is a group of discrimination studies that focus on labor market segmentation caused by educational choices. See 
Asali (2010) to see how we measure such discrimination that is attributable to occupational segregation. However, in our 
study there is no evidence for such type of discrimination.  
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The striking result here is not only the significant and stable preferential treatment of Georgians overall, but 
the fact that once the employer knows the ethnicity of the applicant he or she does not look further at the 
applicants’ qualifications and background—these have no effect whatsoever on the probability of being called 
back.12 Put simply, the single most important variable in hiring decisions in Georgia is ethnicity.  
B. Results from Observational Data  
To evaluate the representativeness of our experimental sample—and thus the external validity of our results, 
as well as to test the implication of using observational data in estimation, we pooled the Integrated Household 
Surveys of Georgia (collected and maintained by GEO-STAT: the statistical office of Georgia) of two years: 
2009 and 2010. We then restricted the sample to Georgians, Azeri, and Armenians, aged 23-32, with higher 
education, to match the selection criteria in our experiment.13  
Table 6 shows the summary statistics of the demographic variables which are the counterparts of the variables 
devised in our experiment. Comparing the averages of each of these variables from the national data (Table 6) 
with the averages of the equivalent variables from our study (Table 4), we observe that the averages almost 
completely coincide with each other, lending support to the representativeness of our sample, as well as to the 
external validity of the analysis results based on these data.  
[TABLE 6] 
While it is impossible to replicate the analysis using data from the readily available household surveys, because 
there is no data about job search activities—in particular, no data about “callbacks” after job applications, it is 
still possible to carry out a closely related exercise. Namely, we carry out similar analysis using the household 
data, but replacing the dependent variable of “callbacks” with the actual variable of being “employed,” defined 
                                                          
12 We also estimated similar models with job applicants’ characteristics as controls, separately for Georgians and non-
Georgians (tables not shown but available upon request). According to these results the coefficients of resume 
characteristics are not statistically different between Georgians and non-Georgians. Also, the firm being domestic having 
a positive effect (only once significant) is related to the issue of workers’ competition for jobs at multinational corporations 
(see Asali et al. 2016, for a discussion). 
13 We analyze the household survey data from all regions, not only Tbilisi. The sample size of observations from Tbilisi 
only is too small to warrant precise estimation of the complementary log-log model; notwithstanding, the summary 
statistics of the subsample of Tbilisi are very similar to those from the general sample.  
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as a worker with positive income from hired work. Table 7 reports the results from this analysis. 
[TABLE 7] 
As is expected from observational data, the causal effects of the different variables would be biased unless one 
controls for all potential, relevant variables. Hence, column (1) of the table, where we calculate the marginal 
effects from a complementary log-log model of employment against female, Georgian, and Armenian, without 
controlling for any additional variable, indeed reports a huge estimate of favoritism towards Georgians (about 
30% more likely to be employed than Azeri); it also reports a large estimate of favoritism towards Armenians 
as opposed to Azeri (26.5%), and these effects are highly statistically significant.  
Controlling for some demographic variables, like age and experience, as shown in column (2), does not 
ameliorate the bias—it still reports a large and significant favoritism factor for Georgians and Armenians, 
similar to column (1). Controlling for occupational and industrial affiliation, however, pulls the estimates to 
the ballpark of the experimental estimates both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, Georgians are 
shown to enjoy a higher probability of being employed (11.4%) than Azeri, and Armenians are equally 
employable to Azeri, and experience no favoritism.  
These findings match what we found for callbacks in our experimental study, although the effect for Georgians 
is slightly exaggerated. Not only findings from the two exercises (using experimental data as opposed to using 
observational survey data) support each other, but their similarity is reassuring, as it invalidates the claims 
about observational data being futile for causal inference. If used correctly, observational data can still help us 
learn about and answer important questions, even if not perfectly precisely.  
C. Macroeconomic trends and discrimination 
Unlike other similar studies, our experiment has a longitudinal virtue: rather than being a one-shot experiment, 
it is an exercise that spans twelve months. This fact can be used to study the relationship between the overall 
healthiness of the economy, measured by unemployment, and the extent of discrimination in hiring as measured 
in this study.  
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To do that, we estimate the difference in the probability of a callback between Georgians and non-Georgians, 
controlling for the applicants’ characteristics—similar to the coefficient of Georgian in column (2) of Table 
5—separately for each month in the study period. This is our measure of discrimination in hiring; call it 
Δ𝑃=Pr(callback|X,G)-Pr(callback|X,NG). We then estimate the following equation: 
Δ𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑡
2 + 𝑒𝑡 
where Δ𝑃𝑡 is the coefficient of the Georgian dummy estimated from a linear probability model of callbacks 
against a Georgian dummy and a set of applicant characteristics (like age, experience, and education), in month 
𝑡, where 𝑡 = 3/2009, … ,2/2010; and 𝑈𝑡−1 is the unemployment rate in the previous month. Quadratic time 
trend is added to control for variables that change with time and affect both the unemployment rate and hiring 
differentials.  
It is worth emphasizing that statistical inference form this estimation is limited, given the small sample (we 
have only twelve observations to run this regression); also due to the fact that Δ𝑃 is itself estimated rather than 
given. This estimation provides at best a suggestive correlational interpretation rather than a decisive causal 
one. That said, the result of this estimation is ?̂? = 1.92 (𝑅2 = .56). 
This result simply means that unemployment is positively correlated with ethnic discrimination in hiring. The 
increase in unemployment reduces the number of callbacks (employers are more reluctant to hire new staff) 
but more so for non-Georgians. A 1% increase in (absolute) unemployment increases the ethnic gap in the 
probability of callback by 0.02. (Given an average differential in the probability of callback of 0.058 and an 
average unemployment rate of 16.2%, this implies an elasticity of discrimination with respect to unemployment 
of 0.5.)  
IV. Conclusions 
This paper is the first using an experimental design similar to that devised by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) 
to document the existence and the extent of ethnic-based discrimination in Former Soviet Union and Central 
and Eastern European countries. Our analysis provides robust evidence about the discriminatory treatment that 
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non-ethnic-Georgian job searchers face in the hiring process. This may well explain their observed lower 
employment rate in the labor market. We find that Georgians are twice more likely to receive a callback for 
their job application than a non-Georgian applicant. Whereas a Georgian applicant needs to send 7 applicants 
to receive one callback, a non-Georgian applicant needs to send out 16 applications.  
Gender does not play a clear role in the issue of discrimination in hiring in Georgia. Also, while the inter-ethnic 
difference in callback rates is strikingly large, there is no evidence for intra-ethnic callback differentials—
Georgian citizens of Azeri or Armenian ethnic background are treated similarly. 
The single most important variable that employers consider in hiring is ethnicity. Apparently, they decide 
whether or not to hire the applicant only based on his or her ethnicity. Since the applicants’ credentials do not 
matter for the hiring decision, we conclude that statistical discrimination models (due to asymmetric 
information) and taste-based discrimination models (due to employers’ preferences) are equally likely 
explanations for the source and causes of discrimination. We finally note that differentials in callbacks, and 
thus discrimination, tend to increase during economic busts. 
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TABLES: 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Job Posts, Sent Resumes, and Callbacks, by Month. 
Month 3/2009 4/09 5/09 6/09 7/09 8/09 9/09 10/09 11/09 12/09 1/10 2/10 Total 
Posted 
Vacancies 
221 201 204 209 228 211 230 295 261 205 239 241 2745 
Sent 
resumes 
340 164 228 180 244 216 220 168 148 56 48 188 2200 
Callbacks 33 17 38 21 22 10 17 24 11 2 6 15 216 
Callbacks 
per sent 
resumes (%) 9.71 10.37 16.67 11.7 9.0 4.6 7.7 14.3 7.4 3.6 12.5 7.9 9.8 
Notes: The number of posted vacancies per month is taken from the job advertisements web sites www.jobs.ge and 
www.hr.com.ge. Originally we sent 2208 job applications/resumes, and received 220 callbacks. However, in our 
analysis we only used jobs/ads for which a full set of applications was sent: that is, 4 applications; for male-Georgian, 
for female-Georgian, male-non-Georgian, and female non-Georgian; where non-Georgian can be Armenian or Azeri. 
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Table 2: Mean Callback Rates by Ethnicity   
    
% Difference  
GE-NGE 
% Difference 
AM-AZ 
  Georgian Armenian Azeri (p-value) (p-value) 
All 13.36 6.19 6.34 7.09 -.15 
 [1100] [485] [615] (0.000) (0.916) 
      
Old (age>26) 11.38 4.8 3.63 7.45 1.17 
 [536] [125] [358] (0.000) (0.563) 
      
Experienced (exp.>3) 11.82 6.19 8.21 4.82 -2.02 
 [660] [485] [329] (0.001) (0.267) 
      
High Education 11.78 4.17 4.67 7.23 -0.5 
 [484] [120] [364] (0.000) (0.818) 
      
Female 13.64 7.36 7.84 6.00 -0.48 
 [550] [231] [319] (0.001) (0.835) 
      
Male 13.09 5.12 4.73 8.18 0.39 
  [550] [254] [296] (0.000) (0.834) 
Notes: Percent of callbacks from the total applications within the cell group. In square brackets are the total 
numbers of sent resumes within the cell group. The fourth column shows the difference in callback rates 
between Georgians and non-Georgians, with the p-value of the test of equality in callbacks between 
Georgians and non-Georgians within the row group. The fifth column shows the difference in callback rates 
between Armenian and Azeri applicants within the row group, with the p-value of the test of equality of 
callbacks between these two groups. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Callbacks by Job Ad 
Equal Treatment: 
No 
callback  1G+1N  2G+2N 
83.45 76.73  5.09  1.63 
[459] [422]  [28]  [9] 
      
Georgian Favored (GF) 1G+0N  2G+0N  2G+1N 
14.55 10.91  1.82  1.82 
[80] [60]  [10]  [10] 
      
Non-Georgians Favored: (NGF) 1N+0G  2N+0G  2N+1G 
2.0 1.64  0.18  0.18 
[11] [9]  [1]  [1] 
      
H0: GF=NGF      
p-value=0.0000      
(z=10.23)      
Urban Institute net-discrimination: 12.55%     
ILO net discrimination: 53.91%         
Notes: G refers to Georgian, N refers to Non-Georgian. Main entries are the percentages of 
the respective cells from the total 550 job ads. 2N+1G refers to the percent of ads for which 
exactly 2 non-Georgian and 1 Georgian applicants received callbacks. The other cells are 
defined similarly. In brackets is the number of ads in each cell. Reported also is the test for 
the null hypothesis that employers who preferred Georgians and those who preferred non-
Georgians have done so equally likely. The Urban institute definition of net discrimination 
is simply the difference between the cases where Georgians were favored and those where 
non-Georgians were favored, from the total ads (550). The ILO definition excludes the "no-
callback cases" (422) altogether, so the difference is divided by a smaller subsample (here 
550-422=128). 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Resume Characteristics 
   Georgian  Non-Georgian 
  All   Male   Female   Male   Female 
Female 0.5         
 (0.5)         
Age 26.60  26.82  26.09  26.96  26.51 
 (2.01)  (1.92)  (2.35)  (1.61)  (1.97) 
Old (age>26) 0.46  0.39  0.59  0.52  0.36 
 (0.5)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.5)  (0.48) 
Experience 4.56  4.78  4.17  4.68  4.63 
 (2.24)  (2.16)  (2.23)  (2.12)  (2.39) 
Experienced (exp.>3) 0.67  0.73  0.47  0.74  0.74 
 (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.5)  (0.44)  (0.44) 
Foreign Exp./Educ. 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
 (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28) 
BA 0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56 
 (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.5) 
MA or above 0.44  0.44  0.44  0.44  0.44 
 (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.5) 
MA or MBA 0.38  0.44  0.36  0.36  0.36 
 (0.48)  (0.5)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
MA & MBA, or PhD 0.06  0.00  0.08  0.08  0.08 
 (0.24)  (0)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28) 
          
Sample size 2200   550   550   550   550 
Notes: Reported are the means and standard deviations for the variables listed in the resumes, decomposed 
by gender and ethnicity of the applicants. The first column refers to the whole pooled sample of applicants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Table 5: Complementary log-log regression with callback dummy as dependent variable 
Callback (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Female 0.015 -0.000 0.005 0.004 
 [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] 
Georgian ethnicity = 1 0.070*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
 [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] 
Armenian ethnicity = 1 -0.002 -0.010 0.012 0.012 
 [0.024] [0.022] [0.024] [0.023] 
Applicant Characteristics:     
Age  -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Experience  0.008 0.020 0.030 
  [0.033] [0.030] [0.031] 
Experience squared  -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Education (MA or MBA)  -0.029 -0.014 0.007 
  [0.019] [0.018] [0.020] 
Education (MA and MBA)  0.079 0.109 0.160 
  [0.104] [0.111] [0.130] 
Education (PhD)  -0.050 -0.025 -0.005 
  [0.043] [0.048] [0.056] 
Foreign experience or education  0.234 0.262 0.254 
  [0.261] [0.275] [0.279] 
Job Characteristics:     
Private   -0.001 -0.000 
   [0.036] [0.032] 
Domestic   0.026* 0.020 
   [0.015] [0.016] 
NGO   -0.011 -0.007 
   [0.036] [0.036] 
     
Industry and Occupational Dummies  No No Yes Yes 
Job requirements No No No Yes 
     
Observations 2,200 2,200 2,188 2,168 
Notes: Each column represents a complementary log-log regression with the callback dummy as dependent 
variable. Reported are the marginal effects of the relevant variables on the probability of a callback for 
continuous variables and estimated discrete changes for the dummy variables. Job requirements controls 
include: required foreign language, required experience in years, dummies for minimum required education 
(BA, MA, etc...), dummies for technical skills (specific, generic), and dummies for other skills (specific, 
generic). Robust standard errors, clustered at the employment-ad level, are in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of workers from the Integrated Household Survey National Data (2009-10) 
  
  
   Georgian  Non-Georgian 
  All  Male  Female  Male  Female 
Female 0.53         
 (0.5)         
Age 27.36  27.47  27.27  27.25  27.22 
 (2.86)  (2.89)  (2.87)  (2.32)  (2.7) 
Old (>26) 0.57  0.59  0.56  0.65  0.58 
 (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.5)  (0.48)  (0.5) 
Experience 4.77  4.86  4.72  4.35  4.57 
 (2.93)  (2.94)  (2.95)  (2.23)  (2.89) 
Experienced (>3) 0.62  0.63  0.61  0.66  0.61 
 (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.49) 
Foreign Exper/Educ 0.09  0.08  0.09  0.14  0.07 
 (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.29)  (0.34)  (0.25) 
BA 0.16  0.16  0.18  0.05  0.10 
 (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.38)  (0.21)  (0.3) 
MA or above 0.84  0.84  0.82  0.95  0.90 
 (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.38)  (0.21)  (0.3) 
Sample size 8345  3739  4231  195  180 
Notes: Reported are the means and the standard deviations (in parentheses) of the respective characteristics 
in the relevant cells. Calculations from the Integrated Household Survey of Georgia (2009-10), the National 
Statistics Office of Georgia. To be most comparable to our experimental sample, the household survey 
samples were restricted to: Georgians, Azeri, and Armenians (excluding other minority groups); workers 
aged 23 to 32; those with higher education (above high school). Experience is defined as 𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 5 − 𝑏, where 
𝑏 is 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20 for the education groups gymnasium, college, bachelor, master’s, and doctor’s. Old 
is a dummy variable for workers aged 27 or older, and experienced is a dummy variable for workers with 4 
or more years of experience.  
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Table 7: Complementary log-log regression with “employed” as dependent variable, Household 
Survey Data 
Employed (1) (2) (3)  
Female -0.016 -0.015 0.000  
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.015]  
Georgian 0.299*** 0.303*** 0.114***  
 [0.040] [0.040] [0.048]  
Armenian  0.265*** 0.265*** 0.032  
 [0.032] [0.032] [0.044]  
Age  -0.012 -0.058  
  [0.016] [0.047]  
Experience   0.022 0.061  
  [0.017] [0.049]  
Experience squared   -0.001* -0.001  
  [0.001] [0.001]  
     
     
Worker controls No Yes Yes  
Industry and Occupational Dummies No No Yes  
Observations 8345 8345 4085  
Notes: “Employed” is defined as worker with positive income from hired work. Regressions use data from the 
Integrated Household Survey of Georgia for the years 2009 and 2010 (GeoStat: the National Statistics Office of 
Georgia). The household survey samples were restricted to: Georgians, Azeri, and Armenians (excluding other 
minority groups); workers aged 23 to 32; those with higher education (above high school). Reported are the 
marginal effects (or the discrete changes) for the respective variables. Other variables include the type of diploma the 
worker got, foreign experience, and one digit occupational and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
